Charged Affairs

By JJ Enoch | Rising Expert on Africa | July 19, 2025 | Photo Credit: Flickr

On May 28th, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) commemorated its 50th anniversary in a moment of profound uncertainty. Founded in 1975 to support economic growth, cooperation, and peace among West African countries, ECOWAS now faces serious challenges. These include internal disagreements, growing insecurity, and concerns that it may be losing relevance in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.

The recent withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – three Sahel nations now governed by military juntas – to create the Alliance des États du Sahel (Alliance of Sahel States, AES), underscore a troubling reality: ECOWAS is losing its utility as the region’s economic and political engine. For ECOWAS to remain relevant for the next half-century, it must prioritize regional security cooperation even with military-led governments, recalibrate its approach to democratic enforcement, engage more deeply with civil society, and adopt a visibly neutral stance in global geopolitical rivalries.

The making of a regional vision

ECOWAS was conceived as a vehicle for prosperity, modeled partly after the European Union. Its founding treaty emphasized free trade, shared economic policies, and a collective customs tariff. Over time, it evolved to include promoting democratic governance norms, most notably through its 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which rejected unconstitutional changes of power.

For years, ECOWAS played a stabilizing role in West Africa. It mediated conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, deployed peacekeepers, and pressured autocrats to hold free and fair elections. However, its credibility is now being questioned by citizens of member states. The bloc’s inconsistent responses to political crises – such as its silence over controversial third-term bids by presidents in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, which many saw as unconstitutional power grabs – stand in stark contrast to its swift and forceful reaction to the 2023 military coup in Niger, where ECOWAS threatened military intervention. This disparity in response has fueled perceptions of hypocrisy, suggesting that ECOWAS applies its democratic principles selectively, undermining its credibility amongst its citizens.

Why ECOWAS is losing the Sahel

The terrorism and insurgency crisis in the Sahel exposes ECOWAS’s limitations. Despite years of national and international counterterrorism efforts – including ECOWAS-backed initiatives – violence in the Sahel has worsened, displacing millions and crippling local economies. While ECOWAS is not solely to blame, its limited coordination, insufficient support to frontline states, and lack of a unified security strategy have hindered meaningful progress, contributing to growing public frustration with the bloc’s effectiveness.

Disgruntled populations, disillusioned with civilian leaders, initially welcomed military takeovers, viewing soldiers as more decisive in confronting violent jihadist threats. However, as these juntas have largely failed to stem the spread of insurgent violence, public enthusiasm has waned, replaced by growing frustration over continued insecurity, economic hardship, and authoritarian rule. For instance, in Mali, four years into military rule following the 2020 coup, citizens are experiencing continued economic hardship and power outages. Despite initial support, many Malians now express dissatisfaction over the junta’s failure to deliver on promises of improved security and economic stability. Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré remains a counterweight to this trend, retaining domestic support through nationalist rhetoric, anti-Western posturing, and populist mobilization. However, his appeal may weaken if jihadist gains and economic struggles persist, mirroring Mali’s trajectory.

ECOWAS’s response which included levying sanctions against the juntas in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, backfired. Rather than isolating the military governments, ECOWAS’s punitive measures pushed them closer to alternative allies, such as Russia and Turkey, as well as to one another through the formation of the AES. These partnerships were driven by a shared rejection of France’s influence in the region, a desire for military and diplomatic support without democratic conditions, and a collective ambition to reshape regional security frameworks on their own terms.

To this end, the lesson is clear: ECOWAS cannot enforce democracy by decree. Its current strategy, centered on suspensions and sanctions, has done little to reverse coups and has pushed military regimes further away. By failing to engage with these governments or offer credible reintegration pathways, ECOWAS is not only forfeiting influence in the Sahel but also sending a signal that it is unwilling or unable to adapt to complex political realities.

Reforming ECOWAS for a new era

To regain the trust of its citizens, ECOWAS must adapt. Four key reforms could redefine its role:

Prioritize security cooperation while supporting democratic transition: Governance deficits fuel the Sahel’s instability, but acute insecurity remains the most urgent challenge, rooted in institutional weakness. ECOWAS should bolster regional security cooperation while incrementally rebuilding state legitimacy. Pragmatic engagement with military-led regimes – conditioned on humanitarian norms and credible transition timelines – can stabilize conflict zones without abandoning democratic principles. Financing these efforts is critical; hence, ECOWAS must innovate by leveraging diaspora contributions and private sector partnerships. Balancing immediate security needs with long-term governance objectives is crucial to achieving sustainable stability.

Recalibrate democratic enforcement: While upholding democratic principles, ECOWAS should replace punitive sanctions, which often entrench juntas, with incentives and rewards that promote democratic stability. Instead of blanket isolation, the bloc could pursue conditional engagement strategies that emphasize inclusive transition processes backed by regional oversight and clear, enforceable benchmarks. Admittedly, juntas frequently manipulate transition timelines and orchestrate sham elections to consolidate power. To mitigate this, ECOWAS must tie any diplomatic or economic incentives to demonstrable progress, such as the release of political prisoners, legal reforms, and credible electoral planning, with independent monitoring and consequences for backsliding. The goal is not naïve optimism, but a more calibrated, outcomes-driven approach that balances pressure with engagement.

Engage citizens and civil society: ECOWAS is often seen as a club of presidents, rather than a people-centered institution. Expanding dialogue with grassroots movements, trade unions, and youth organizations could make ECOWAS’s policies more responsive to public demands. This could involve establishing regular civil society forums ahead of major summits, integrating citizen feedback into conflict mediation efforts, and creating youth advisory panels to inform regional employment, education, and security strategies.

Navigate geopolitical competition with strategic unity: With great powers vying for influence across Africa, ECOWAS must avoid becoming a pawn in geopolitical rivalries that further fragment the region. To remain relevant and practical, the bloc must adopt a cohesive and strategic stance that reflects the collective interests of West African states. By championing unified positions on global issues, such as debt relief and climate financing, ECOWAS can enhance its bargaining power, attract resources on its own terms, and shield member states from external manipulation. Maintaining this autonomy will require not just avoiding entanglement in divisive global issues but actively cultivating a principled non-alignment that prioritizes regional coherence.

Conclusion

At 50, ECOWAS is not obsolete; however, it must continue to evolve. The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is a wake-up call: regional integration cannot thrive without addressing the security and economic needs of its citizens. By embracing flexibility, prioritizing pragmatism over dogma, and reconnecting with disillusioned populations, ECOWAS can begin to reclaim its role as West Africa’s stabilizing force. While there is no guarantee that the AES leaders will choose to re-engage with ECOWAS, ECOWAS must still offer credible incentives, such as security cooperation, economic collaboration, and transitional support frameworks, that make reintegration a rational and appealing option compared to prolonged isolation.

JJ Enoch is a 2025 Rising Expert on Africa for Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. He serves as an Associate in the Strategy & Risk Advisory unit at J.S. Held, where he advises corporate clients in telecom, logistics, and FMCG sectors on investment risks and political-economic trends in Anglophone West Africa and ECOWAS. He holds an MSc in African Studies from the University of Oxford and a law degree from Bowen University, Nigeria.