Charged Affairs

By Fenja Tramsen | Rising Expert on Development Cooperation | October 28, 2025 | Photo Credit: Flickr

The agreement between Rome and Tirana to establish offshore asylum processing centres in Albania has been heavily promoted by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government as a bold step towards deterring irregular migration. Yet, months after construction finished, the facilities remain largely empty – save for stray dogs seeking shelter.

The project plans to hold asylum seekers entering Italy in Albanian facilities while their claims are processed under Italian jurisdiction. On paper, it offers the promise of speed: fewer people attempting dangerous sea crossings, a streamlined asylum process, and the dismantling of smuggling networks. In practice, the project is plagued by legal challenges, human rights concerns, and huge costs.

Despite these issues, more European states are following Italy’s lead. The UK planned to send asylum seekers to centres in Rwanda, Denmark passed a law allowing processing in non-EU states, and Germany examined similar options.

What are the problems?

The first hurdle is legality. Albania is not part of the European Union (EU), and moving asylum seekers there distances them from the judicial oversight and rights protections that EU law demands. Courts have already intervened, blocking transfers and sending asylum seekers back to Italy. The European Court of Justice dealt the policy a further blow by ruling that Italy’s approach to designating certain countries as “safe” for return was lacking in transparency and judicial review.

Australia’s offshore processing system, the blueprint for many current plans, faced sustained criticism from international legal bodies. Between 2012 and 2024, Australia spent AUD 12 billion detaining 4,194 people on Nauru and Papua New Guinea, a system the UN Human Rights Committee repeatedly condemned for violating international law. 

European migration governance depends on states upholding international law. The principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits sending people to places where they may face persecution or harm, forms the cornerstone of refugee protection. By pushing asylum seekers into offshore facilities in a third country, Italy attempts to distance itself from direct responsibility while still exerting control. This represents part of a growing trend of “externalisation” in migration policy, where wealthier states shift their obligations onto others, who often possess fewer resources and weaker legal safeguards.

The humanitarian risks prove equally troubling. Offshore facilities become prone to neglect and abuse. Australia’s processing centres documented significant cases of abuse, including egregious neglect, sexual assault, and physical attacks. Human Rights Watch documented systematic failures of medical care, with asylum seekers denied adequate treatment for months or years.

For those who might be detained in Albania, risks include limited access to legal representation, difficulties lodging appeals, and stress from confinement in an unfamiliar country. The geographical distance from Italy exacerbates these problems, as asylum seekers struggle to maintain contact with lawyers, NGOs, or family members who could advocate for them. Italy’s arrangement creates attenuated governance, characterised by the deliberate separation between policymakers and the human rights violations their policies often cause. When problems arise, officials can deflect accountability onto Albanian authorities while claiming ignorance of conditions on the ground.

From a fiscal standpoint, the plan also proves strikingly wasteful. Italy’s five-year contract with Albania reportedly costs €670 million, a staggering sum for a policy that may never operate at full capacity. The cost per asylum seeker for Italy may also prove too expensive. For instance, Australia spent over AUD $400,000 per asylum seeker detained on Nauru in 2014.

Italy’s political spectacle 

This political spectacle serves domestic politics. Migration has become a central and polarising issue across Europe. Over 150,000 migrants arrived in Italy through maritime routes in 2023, although this number dropped to 66,000 in 2024. The Albanian deal allows Meloni’s government to claim decisive action, even if the policy’s actual impact remains negligible.

By normalising the outsourcing of asylum obligations, Italy risks encouraging other states to follow suit, weakening the already fragile international refugee protection regime. This creates a “race to the bottom” in migration governance, where countries compete to develop the most restrictive policies rather than sharing responsibility for migrant protection.

Irregular migration across the Mediterranean remains a genuine concern for European policymakers. But the solution cannot involve abandoning the rules and principles that have guided international refugee protection for decades.

Italy should focus on proven alternatives within existing legal frameworks, including faster and fairer asylum processing within its borders, strengthened legal migration pathways, and enhanced burden-sharing mechanisms with EU partners. Additionally, Italy could consider entering into comprehensive migration agreements similar to those Germany has pursued with India, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kenya. These agreements combine return cooperation with expanded legal migration opportunities, offering concrete benefits while managing irregular migration more effectively than punitive offshore processing.

Ultimately, other European countries watching the Albania-Italy deal unfold would do well to learn from Italy’s and Australia’s mistakes rather than repeat them. What looks like decisive action today will likely be remembered as an expensive experiment in evading responsibility.

Fenja Tramsen is a 2025 Rising Expert in Development Cooperation with Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and a research assistant at the Oxford Department of International Development.