Charged Affairs

By Patrycja Jasiurska | Rising Expert on Multilateralism and Diplomacy | January 23, 2026 | Photo Credit: Flickr

“If I ask China to build a road, I’ll be driving down it in the time it takes the World Bank to approve the loan.” This statement, attributed to an African head of state, briefly summarize how decision-makers contrast Western conditionality and formality with Beijing’s speed and flexibility. Today, it is clear that while the European Union and international organizations toil, China has rewritten the rules of the international development system. If its development assistance wishes to remain competitive with rivals,  the EU has no choice but to reevaluate its offers and instead prioritise a more pragmatic but principled pragmatism.

Principled bull and agile dragon

Even on the surface, the development models of the EU and its counterparts in China vary considerably. To start, the EU and its member states are the world’s biggest donors of development assistance (€95.6 billion in 2023), while Chinese official development assistance (ODA) barely reached 3 billion USD in 2023. However, this figure does not represent the scale of Chinese engagements in development cooperation. Instead of traditional assistance, China focuses on providing loans to developing countries amounting to $87 billion in 2023 (~€75 billion). These financial commitments show China is a significant player in development cooperation, which is matched by its innovative approach.

The EU approach focuses on comprehensive development partnerships that strengthen long-term development and accommodate recipient countries’ unique circumstances. The EU’s approach enhances its partnerships and helps other diplomatic priorities like the regulation of migration flows by improving the economies of the origin countries. In contrast,  China focuses on infrastructure projects to enhance global connectivity and supply chains. This way, its development approach supports the recipient countries but also improves its own economic security and influence.

On the one hand, China offers faster and more flexible financial support, without imposing political conditions, and is more likely to fund risky projects compared to the EU. On the other hand, China mostly offers market-rate loans, which need to be paid off within 10 years, as opposed to the assistance grants offered by the EU.  

Other differences also separate the EU and China. For example, in order to expedite work, China brings in its own experts for a project’s duration, while the EU focuses on building capacity within the recipient country. The EU also focuses on long-term partnerships with the recipient countries. It aims to involve them in creating comprehensive development projects. 

For instance, as a part of its efforts to boost partnerships with Africa in the area of the critical raw materials, the EU is organising trainings for African geoscientists in geological mapping, mineral resources assessment, artisanal and small-scale mining, and environmental management of mines. At the same time, China concentrates on infrastructure projects, which are executed by Chinese contractors and provide limited ownership opportunities to the recipient countries. 

Despite the EU’s seeming advantages, developing countries more frequently opt for cooperation with China, valuing its speed, flexibility and lack of direct political conditions.

Influencing internal policies through development aid

In another contrast to Europe’s approach, Chinese development is known for its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of partner countries, offering assistance without stringent political conditionalities. The EU, meanwhile, places political conditionality at the heart of its development assistance, linking the development assistance with the expectation that the recipient country will introduce domestic policies promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance. Europe’s conditionality is motivated by the belief that good governance is a necessity for successful socio-economic development. But the EU conditions are often criticised for being patronizing and based on double standards, which harm its relations with the Global South.

The EU imposes its conditions to mitigate corruption and financial mismanagement. But China has found a different way to protect against that without political conditionality.  It protects its loans by using the borrower’s natural resources and future income as collateral. This lets China secure repayment even in corrupt, resource-rich countries.

Nonetheless, despite the official narrative of non-interference, China is being accused of using its development finance to indirectly influence the foreign policy of the recipients. AidData reveals that African countries who vote in line with China at the UN General Assembly often receive more development assistance from Beijing than those that are less aligned in voting. This allows China to gain supporters of the policies which are unpopular on the international stage, such as a refusal to condemn human rights violations in North Korea. This shows that there are some indirect political conditions for Chinese help, but unlike in the case of the EU, they concern the foreign rather than domestic policy, a detail far more acceptable to the recipient states.

China rewrites the rules of the game

China’s success in courting developing countries shows how it has changed international development cooperation. First, it provided the recipient countries with an alternative to conditional development assistance offered by the EU and other western donors. The developing countries, wary of interference in their governance, are more keen to strike deals with Beijing. Secondly, it popularised the loan-based development assistance model. While the EU was relying on grants, China presented an approach that, while much more financially costly for the recipient, also offers much more freedom, flexibility, and risk tolerance. Lastly, Beijing offers developing countries greater speed in the implementation of its projects since it brings its own workers and expertise from China to quickly execute the task. 

These innovations admittedly have their downsides. There may be no explicit conditionality, but the design of the Chinese development assistance makes the recipients more prone to be dependent on Beijing both technologically and financially, which makes them susceptible to its influence, which limits their sovereignty in the long run.

The way forward for Europe

Despite its disadvantages, many Global South countries increasingly turn to China rather than the EU for development assistance. Hence, the EU needs to take the lead in innovating the international development system instead of merely reacting to the changes introduced by China. 

The EU has already taken steps towards improving its efficiency. For instance, it has introduced EFSD+, a mechanism that uses EU funds to provide guarantees covering part of a bank’s potential losses, encouraging banks to invest much larger amounts in projects in developing countries. 

However, the main constraint on the EU is not access to funding, but its fragmented and heavily outsourced planning process. Global Gateway teams are mostly project managers, with limited in-house technical expertise. When a proposal arrives, the EU usually launches an external tender for consultants to conduct pre-feasibility studies on design, costs, and risks. This often takes many months or even years. Building permanent in-house teams to carry out pre-feasibility work would speed up project development, reduce bureaucracy, and make EU projects even more coherent.

China typically engages in technically mature projects, which allows for faster execution. This does not have to disadvantage the EU. Early-stage project development creates space for co-creation and innovation. But to benefit from this approach, the EU must make it efficient. Strong in-house pre-feasibility teams could significantly shorten timelines and make EU projects more attractive than Chinese ones, which are fast but often more costly for recipients in the long run

Patrycja Jasiurska (she/her) is the 2025 Rising Expert on Multilateralism and Diplomacy. She holds an MSc in Public Policy at University College London and EU International Relations and Diplomacy at College of Europe. She currently works as an international cooperation assistant at the European Commission. The views of the author do not represent those of her employer.