Charged Affairs

By Cole Penz | 2026 Rising Expert on Latin America | April 23, 2026 | Photo Credit: David Restrepo

Jorge Torres Victoria (alias Pablo Catatumbo) was a central leader in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the oldest guerilla movement in the Western Hemisphere. After being charged with a litany of offenses including terrorism, murder, and drug trafficking, the U.S. Department of State offered $2.5 million for information leading to his capture. Today, Torres Victoria is a Senator representing the party Comunes. From this position he has publicly admitted to earlier crimes which included sabotaging elections. Unsurprisingly, his presence in the Senate is controversial.

Comunes is the FARC’s political successor and has enjoyed ten seats in the Colombian Congress (five in the Senate and five in the Chamber of Representatives) without the need to rely on the ballot box since 2018. This political benefit was a crucial component of the ambitious 2016 peace accord between the FARC and the government which envisioned a process through which the armed group would become “a valid player within the democratic system”. The guarantee of congressional representation was intended to allow sufficient time and space for the FARC to construct a legitimate political force expressed via Colombia’s democratic institutions. This assurance expired with the past March 8 legislative election where Comunes lost all their seats. Over the past eight years, the Colombian public has not warmed to the party representing demobilized FARC fighters. The party has failed to secure any electoral victories except a few local positions. A lack of previous success coupled with the dismal result on March 8 indicate Comunes faces political obscurity. The demise of the party that was supposed to signify a new chapter moving from conflict to democracy demonstrates the unrealized ambition of political reincorporation thus lowering the likelihood of a similarly ambitious peace deal in Colombia’s near to medium-term future.

Never Far from Controversy

            Comunes members first occupied their seats in 2018 to cries of “assassins” from other congressional representatives. The accusation was far from a fringe viewpoint. The Colombian public rejected via plebiscite the first deal between the FARC and government with a common view that it was too lenient on FARC leaders. Despite other revisions, the ten guaranteed congressional seats remained in the subsequent deal that was submitted to Congress—instead of another referendum—for approval. Once passed, thousands offighters demobilized, and the guerilla’s leadership called for the replacement of armed struggle with political struggle. However, the group never relinquished its overall objective to “overcome the capitalist social order present in Colombian society”. Comunes was the new vehicle to achieve that aim.

            Demobilization, however, did not result in a durable, peaceful transition. The first major crack occurred in 2019 when key FARC leaders announced a return to armed conflict and accused the government of failing to fulfill its promises. The returning insurgents joined the over 1,500 FARC members who never demobilized, or had already remobilized, amid an increasingly fragmented security environment. In the intervening years, numerous illegal armed groups had been competing to replace the FARC’s previous dominance. Consequently, violence steadily rose as illegal armed groups combatted each other and the government. Those still committed to the peace deal were not exempt. Close to 500 demobilized FARC fighters have been killed in the past decade. 

Fading Optimism

            The central aim of Comunes was to provide a pathway for the political incorporation of FARC demands negating the need for armed conflict. Clearly, that was not achieved as envisioned. The ranks of the FARC dissidents have swollen to around 5,000 while Comunes has steadily lost support. After facing rejection from the most popular leftist political force—President Gustavo Petro’s Pacto Histórico—the party joined the less influential Fuerza Ciudadana coalition while facing abysmal polling numbers below 1% before the recent legislative election. In this case, the polls were accurate. The poor electoral performance means Comunes failed to retain its legal party status. The FARC dissidents, it seems, are growing more popular as Comunes continually slips into political irrelevance.

            The demise of Comunes is emblematic of faltering faith in negotiated peace processes which is reflected in the broader political scene. On the left, President Petro’s wide-ranging peace negotiations have not produced any durable success stories. Consequently, he has turned to a more militarized approach to include restarting the chemical eradication of coca fields and aerial bombardments both of which contravene earlier promises. Recently appointed General Commander of the Armed Forces General Hugo López confirmed the aerial bombardments will continue. On the other side of the political spectrum, criticisms of political reincorporation are more explicit. A frontrunner on the political right in the ongoing presidential campaign, Abelardo de la Espriella, recently said, “I will not negotiate any peace deal. Peace is not negotiated…. Peace is imposed by the armed forces and the law.”

Where does that leave the peace process?

            The collapse of Comunes should serve as a point of reflection. The 2016 peace accord is nearly a decade old while one of its central promises of political reincorporation has not fully materialized. According to who one asks, there are myriad factors to blame including recalcitrant guerilla leaders, a national government failing to protect demobilized FARC members, or a vast global demand for illicit drugs that dramatically raises the financial opportunity costs of acting as “a valid player”. The project of transition, as it stands, is at best a work in progress behind schedule.

            A broader takeaway is neither side—the FARC or the government—fully received what they wanted through political reincorporation, disincentivizing similar efforts in the future. In the early 2000s, the FARC was the largest illegal group armed in Colombia. Now, the segment that stuck to demobilization is witnessing a failing political party while those who remobilized are weaker than their rivals, namely the Gulf Clan and the National Liberation Army. What incentives, therefore, do these now dominant rivals have in demobilization negotiations? The government, on the other hand, has seen a rapid rise in FARC remobilizations which has created an increasingly complex and violent security environment. How can government negotiators ensure any future negotiated peace would turn the remaining groups into upstanding democratic actors?

Comunes was never intended to singlehandedly usher in a new era of harmony for Colombia. Nonetheless, its likely disappearance as a political force reflects the ongoing disillusionment with the peace process as a whole, thus diminishing the opportunity window for future ambitious negotiations. While the process is not dead, it is on thin ice. The new slate of representatives elected on March 8 will prove consequential in deciding whether to advance or bury the legacy of 2016.

Cole Penz is a master’s student at the University of Cambridge where his research is focused on the internal armed conflict in Colombia and US-Latin American relations. He is also a research assistant at the university’s Centre for Geopolitics. Named the 2026 Rising Expert in Latin America Policy by Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, Cole previously worked as a political-military analyst for the US Department of Defense in Washington, DC and the US Embassy in Mexico City. He speaks Spanish, Portuguese, and French. Cole graduated summa cum laude from George Washington University with a BA in international affairs.